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NOTES

PRODUCTS LIABILITY: DOCTRINAL PROBLEMS AND THE
RESTATEMENT'S ANSWER
Products liability is one of the fastest growing areas in the law
today. As a classic example of the growth and development characterizing the dynamic aspect of the law, it has received much attention
from the commentators., The sheer volume of cases and the rapidly
changing doctrinal picture necessitates a periodic assessment of the
law, its trends, and the underlying social values and theories that
impel it.
Some idea of the rapidity of change in the field of products li2
ability can be gleaned from this statement by Dean Prosser:
Since 1962 there have been so many decisions extending strict
liability beyond products "for intimate bodily use" that it has
become evident that this is the law of the immediate future....
With the exception of the law relating to prenatal injuries, this
is the most radical and spectacular development in tort law
during this century.
This note seeks to combine a short survey of recent national
trends in the law of products liability for consumer injuries with a
picture of the Florida law as it stands today, an analysis of the theoretical basis of liability, and a view of the new approach formulated
by the Restatement of Torts, Second. In addition, the authors have
conducted a survey among corporate counsel of the nation's leading
manufacturers, seeking their interpretation of the impact of increasing liability on manufacturers' attitudes and practices. An outline of
the organization to be followed may be of assistance to the reader:
(a) historical development of the various doctrinal theories of
liability;
(b) recent national trends in the law of products liability as
indicated by the cases and the rapid revision of the Restatement
of Torts;
(c) Florida law -the problems involved in using sales and
contract doctrine in this area as reflected in the Florida case law;
1. E.g., GILLAM, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY (1960);
Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded?, 1 DUQUESNE L. REV. (1963);
Jaeger,Warrantiesof Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments,
16 Rtrrcaas L. REv. 493 (1962); James, Products Liability, 34 TExAs L. REv. 44, 192
(1955); Knepper, Let the Manufacturer Beware, 25 INS. COUNSEL J. 175 (1958);
Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF L. REv. 614, 809 (1955);
Strict Liability of Manufacturers: A Symposium, 24 TENN. L. Rxv. 923 (1957).
2. RESTATRMENT (SECoND), TORTS, Explanatory Note §402A, at 2 (Tent. Draft
No. 10, 1964).
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(d) the Restatement approach to solution of the problems;
(e) the policy question-is this a proper course to follow?
(f) the survey-what practical impact has expanded liability
produced on the manufacturer?
The purposes for this organization are to illustrate the doctrinal
confusion in this field, to set forth what appears to be a solution to
the problems, and to attempt to determine whether the current trend
is warranted.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

There seems little doubt that the action for breach of warranty had
its origins in tort.3 It was an action on the case, in the nature of
deceit, yet defendant's knowledge of the falsity of his representation
was immaterial. 4 During the eighteenth century, the idea of express
warranty gained recognition as a contractual term and assumpsit
became the accepted theory of action.5 Implied warranty at this time
was limited to a seller's guarantee of title. By 1815, however, the
implied warranty of merchantable quality had definitely made its
appearance in the leading case of Gardiner v. Gray.6 Lord Ellenborough stated the rule as follows:7

I am of opinion, however, that under such circumstances,
the purchaser has a right to expect a saleable article answering
the description in the contract. Without any particular
warranty, this is an implied term in every such contract ...
[T]he intention of both parties must be taken to be, that it
shall be saleable in the market under the demonination [sic]
mentioned in the contract between them. The purchaser cannot be supposed to buy goods to lay them on a dunghill.
Further elaboration on the "dunghill" principle followed. 8 A second
implied warranty, that of fitness for the buyer's "particular" purpose,
developed and the relation between these two distinct, yet often overlapping, warranties was expounded in Jones v. Just.9 This development was one of technical sales doctrine where the injury to the
purchaser was pecuniary rather than corporeal.
3.

Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv.

117 (1943). (The case first noted in the reports is Fitz. Ab. Monst. de Faits, pl. 160
(1383)).
4. See Shippen v. Bowen, 122 U.S. 575 (1887).
5. Stuart v. Wilkins, I Doug. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (1778).
6. 171 Eng. Rep. 46 (H.L. 1815).
7. Id. at 47.
8. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv.
117, 121 (1943), and cases there cited.
9. L.R. 3 Q.B. 197, B. & S. 141, 37 L.J.Q.B. 89 (1868).
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A parallel development occurred in tort law with the line of cases
stemming from Winterbottom v. Wright.0 There, in obiter dictum,
the doctrine of privity of contract in a negligence action first appeared.
In this, the famous case of the injured coachman, the modern law of
products liability can be said to have originated. The erosion of this
outgrowth in the negligence context, as exceptions pursued and eventually gobbled up the rule, is a story often told.:"
A third nineteenth century development, that of strict liability
in tort, must also be considered. Rylands v. Fletcher,2 and the body
of decisional law following it, provided a third strain to the theme
of liability. Here the maxim of "no liability without fault" was replaced with a concept of enterprise liability. 3 A danger has been
created in the search for profits; fairness, therefore, requires that the
cost of the danger be wrung out before the gain.
Preceding all of these developments, a special responsibility had
existed at common law for sellers of food and drink.- 4 Early American decisions accepted this idea as a form of "warranty" and decreed
strict liability against the purveyor of food.' 5 This rule was extended
in some jurisdictions in the twentieth century, after passage of the
Federal Food and Drug Act of 1906, to include the injured consumer
who was not in privity with the manufacturer.' 6 The rationale of
these decisions was based on general public policy and an implied
10. M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch. 1842).
11. E.g., LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1949); Feezer, Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 MINN. L. REv. 752 (1935); Feezer, Tort Liability of
Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1925); James, Products Liability,
34 TExAs L. REv. 192 (1955); Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other
Than Their Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937).
12. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
13. See EHRENzWEIG, NEGLIGENCE WITHOUT FAULT (1951); KAPP, THE SOCIAL
COSTS OF PRVATE ENTERPRISE (1950).
14. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1103-04 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, Assault].
"Some kind of special civil responsibility undoubtedly attached to retail food sales
long before the modem warranties expressed by the sales statutes were developed,
and this responsibility ultimately came to be classed as a 'warranty' obligation.
But whether it presupposed scienter, and whether it was simply absorbed into the
warranties of fitness and merchantability, atrophied from disuse, died with the
repeal of the ancient food statutes in 1844, or survived in legal potentiality until
snuffed out [by the English Sale of Goods Act] in 1894, we cannot be sure." DICKRaSON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE FOOD CONSUMER 26 (1951), cited in Prosser,
Assault 1104.
15. E.g., Moses v. Mead, I Denio 378 (Sup. Ct.), afJ'd, 5 Denia 617, 43 Am.
Dec. 676 (N.Y. 1845); Van Brackin v. Fonda, 12 Johns. R. 468, 7 Am. Dec. 339
(N.Y. 1815).
16. Parks v. G. C. Yost Pie Co., 93 Kan. 334, 144 Pac. 202 (1914); Jackson CocaCola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 791 (1914); Mazetti v. Armour
& Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913).
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representation that the food was safe? 7 The Supreme Court of
Mississippi in 192718 adopted a theory of implied warranty "that the
[food] was pure and wholesome" that "runs with the title" into the
hands of the ultimate consumer.- Clearly the analogy was to the
property concept of warranty running with the land, rather than
the technical sales doctrines. As Dean Prosser points out, "This
[theory] found general, although perhaps undeserved, acceptance and
20
nearly all of the later cases have adopted some theory of 'warranty. '"'
Consequently, the bases of modern products liability law can be
found in four developmental patterns: sales and contract concepts of
breach of warranty; negligence liability for product defects; strict
liability in tort; and breach of "warranty," analogous to covenants in
land, in food cases. It is the merging of these principles into a single
mass and a failure to come to grips with the underlying values involved, that have embroiled the courts in needless doctrinal struggle
and confusion.
RECENT NATIONAL TRENDS

The text of section 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second,
which was recently adopted, is as follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product to User or Consumer:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property, is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to reach the user or consumer in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Caveat: The institute expresses no opinion whether the rules
stated in this section may apply
(1) to harm to persons other than users or consumers;
(2) to the seller of a product expected to be processed or
otherwise changed before it reaches the user or consumer; or
17.
18.
19.
20.

Ibid.
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
Id. at 883, 111 So. at 306-07.
Prosser, Assault 1106.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss3/5

4

1964]

Horn and Scarritt: Products Liability: Doctrinal Problems and the Restatement's Answ
NOTES

(3) to the seller of a component part of a product to be
assembled.
The above text represents the second expansion of section 402A.
In 1961 food alone was included within its provisions;?' then in 1962
strict liability for sellers of "products intended for intimate bodily
use" was added. 22 With the expansion to "any product" in the final
draft, a rapid and drastic change is obviously believed to be occurring. This section had been bitterly criticized in its "intimate bodily
use" form as a "restatement which does not restate" and for unjustifiable "legal legerdemain" in equating warranty without privity and
23
tort.
Food
As of 1960 'a clear majority of those jurisdictions that had considered the question held that privity of contract was not necessary to
recover for consumer injury in a defective food case.24 This trend is
particularly significant considering that the cases requiring privity
are of comparatively ancient vintage and no state has newly recognized such a requirement since 1935.25 Since 1960, moreover, in at
least three of the jurisdictions then thought to be requiring privity in
defective food cases, the requirement has been abolished as to all
2
products. 6
ProductsIntended for "Intimate Bodily Use"
These products, as defined by Tentative Draft No. 7 of the Restatement of Torts, Second,27 include

21. RSTATEENT (SECoND), TORTS §402A (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1961).
22. The text of this draft provided: "One engaged in the business of selling
food for human consumption or other products for intimate bodily use, who sells
such a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the consumer,
is subject to liability for bodily harm thereby caused to one who consumes it,
even though (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of the product, and (b) the consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller." RESrATEMENT (SECOND),
ToRTs §402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
23. Condon, ProductLiability Problems,57 Nw. U.L. REv. 536, 541-42 (1962).
24. See Prosser, Assault 1107-10 and cases there cited.
25.

Ibid.

26. New Jersey-Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 158, 161 A.2d 69
(1960); New York-Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Co., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d
81 (1963); District of Columbia-Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962).
27. Section 402A, at 3 (1962).
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all food and drink, and everything intended for internal human consumption, whether or not it has nutritional value.
Thus the term includes candy, chewing gum or chewing tobacco, snuff, cigarettes, and all raw materials, such as unground
coffee, from which the consumer or some intermediate party
is expected to prepare food or drink ultimately to be consumed.
It includes drugs which are to taken internally, and such an
article as a surgical pin for setting bone fractures, which is to be
incorporated inside of the body. "Intimate bodily use" also includes products intended for external application or contact
with the human body, where such application or contact is of
an intimate character. . . . [T]he question is one of whether
it is intended for a purpose which involves long continued
contact with the person....
Exceptions to the privity requirement in cases involving these
products were largely developments of the 1950's. In Gottsdanker v.
Cutter Laboratories,2s for example, infant plaintiffs were permitted
recovery for injuries- poliomyelitis- suffered as a result of vaccination with serum manufactured by defendant. Privity was held not to
be a requirement because "vaccine is intended for human consumption quite as much as is food. We see no reason to differentiate the
policy considerations requiring pure and wholesome food from those
''
requiring pure and wholesome vaccine. 29
Other products "for intimate bodily use" for which liability in
the absence of privity has been found include soap, 30 detergent,31
clothing such as hula skirts 32 and aprons, 33 a surgical pin for setting
3
3 4
bone fractures, and cigarettes. 5

The cases involving alleged cigarette-induced cancer are in a state
of some flux at the present time. In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co. 3 6 the court reversed a directed verdict for defendant in
28.

182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1960).

29. Id. at 607, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 323.
30. Kruper v. Procter S&Gamble Co., 113 N.E.2d 605 (Ohio App. 1953), rev'd
on other grounds, 160 Ohio St. 489, 117 N.E.2d 7 (1954).
31. Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961); Worley v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W.2d 532 (1952). In both of these cases
express warranties were also found.
32. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F. Supp. 78 (D. Hawaii 1961).
33. Ingalls v. Meissner, 11 Wis. 2d 371, 105 N.W.2d 748 (1960).
34. Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1960) applying Michigan
law.
35. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) certified to
Florida Supreme Court, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d
673 (5th Cir. 1963).
36. 295 F.2d 292 (1961).
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the lower court. It found sufficient evidence as to express and
implied warranties to raise jury questions under Pennsylvania law,
and remanded the case for a new trial.3 7 In Lartigue v. R. J.Reynolds
Tobacco Co.,38 decided after the first Fifth Circuit opinion in Green
v. American Tobacco Co.,39 (discussed below), recovery was denied
under Louisiana law. The court found strict liability in tort to be
the rule for tobacco as well as food, but limited it to "knowable"
risks.
This limitation, to risks "the harmful effects of which no developed
human skill or foresight can [avoid],"40 was then rejected by the
Florida Supreme Court in the second Green decision.41 The more
recent case of Ross v. Philip Morris & Co. 42 has adopted the same
limitation, absolute liability only for "knowable" dangers, which
was applied in Lartigue and rejected in Green.
Any Product
The sweeping provisions of Restatement section 402A, appearing
above, indicate recognition of a marked trend in the decisional law
of the past few years. Although this is not yet the law of a majority
of jurisdictions, it appears to be the law of the immediate future.
Nevertheless, examination of several of the most recent decisions reveals that while some courts have opted for the straightforward strict
liability rationale adopted in the Restatement, others are yet em43
broiled in the doctrinal web of warranty.
The landmark decision in this area is Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc. 44 There, the dealer and manufacturer of a new car with
an apparently defective steering wheel were held liable to the purchaser and his wife, the injured user. Implied warranty of merchantability was the ground of decision: "[U]nder modern marketing con37. "The retrial in Pritchard resulted in a judgment for defendant cigarette
company based upon answers to specific interrogatories submitted to the jury, and
the case is again on appeal. We have been advised that the jury found that smoking
defendant's cigarettes was the cause or one of the causes of the cancer in plaintiff's
right lung; that defendant was not chargeable with negligence which was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; that defendant did not make any express warranty
upon which plaintiff relied and by which he was induced to purchase defendant's
cigarettes; that there was not a breach of warranty implied by law; and that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury by his smoking of cigarettes." Ross v. Philip Morris
& Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
38. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
39. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
40. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
41. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
42. 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
43. See discussion of Florida law infra.
44. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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ditions, when a manufacturer puts a new automobile in the stream
of trade and promotes its purchase by the public, an implied warranty that it is reasonably suitable for use as such accompanies it
into the hands of the ultimate purchaser." 45 The manufacturer's express warranty, which was limited to replacement of defective parts
and disclaimed all other express or implied warranties, was held invalid on public policy grounds. This case has been followed in numerous decisions involving not only automobiles,46 but also has been
used to extend liability to many products other than those intended
47
for intimate bodily use.

A New York decision utilizing the language of warranty, Goldberg
v. Kolisman Instrument Co.,48 also appears to suggest the Restatement

rule. Plaintiff was a passenger on an airplane that crashed, allegedly
as a result of a defective altimeter. In holding the manufacturer of
49
the airplane liable, the court stated:
A breach of warranty, it is now clear, is not only a violation of
the sales contract out of which the warranty arises but is a
tortious wrong suable by a noncontracting party whose use of
the warranted article is within the reasonable contemplation
of the vendor or manufacturer.
A recent California decision, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,0
broke away from the language of warranty and applied strict liability
in tort to the manufacturers of a combination power tool. Plaintiff's
wife had purchased the tool for him as a gift. Plaintiff, while operating the tool as a lathe, was injured when a piece of wood flew out and
51
struck him in the head. The court held:
A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he
places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury
to a human being. Recognized first in the case of unwholesome
food products, such liability has now been extended to a variety of other products that create as great or greater hazards
if defective.

45. Id. at 384, 161 A.2d at 84.
46. Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Supp. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (Super. Ct. 1963);
Picker X-Ray Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App.
1962); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Veber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110

N.W.2d
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

449 (1961).
See cases cited notes 58-72 infra.
12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
Id. at 436, 191 N.E.2d at 82.
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
Id. at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 900-01.
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Although... strict liability has usually been based on the
theory of an express or implied warranty running from the
manufacturer to the plaintiff, the abandonment of the requirement of a contract between them, the recognition that the liability is not assumed by agreement but imposed by law . ..
and the refusal to permit the manufacturer to define the scope
of its own responsibility for defective products ... make clear
that the liability is not one governed by the law of contract
warranties but by the law of strict liability in tort. Accordingly,
rules defining and governing warranties that were developed
to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly
be invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured by their defective products unless those rules also serve
the purposes for which such liability is imposed.
Dean Prosser cites the following jurisdictions as in apparent accord
with the Restatement rule: California, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida (as to manufacturers and partially as to retailers),
Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri (as to manufacturers), New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania (as to ultimate purchasers, their
households, and their guests), and Tennessee. 52 Federal courts have
said that Kansas, Oregon, Texas, and Vermont are in accord.53 Statutes
54
in Virginia and Wyoming are cited as adopting the rule.
Nevertheless, the decisions do not progress in a straight line and
much confusion remains. An example of this is found in the Connecticut decisions. In Simpson v. Powered Products of Michigan55 an
intermediate Connecticut court, utilizing both strict liability and implied warranty language, extended liability to the lessee of a golf
cart who was injured in its operation. Yet in Epstein v. Giannattasio,8 another intermediate Connecticut court bogged down in sales
theory and found no liability for a beauty treatment resulting in loss
of hair. The court felt bound by the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code and could find no "sale" of goods. It relied upon an
analogy to the long-discredited notion that food served in a restaurant
57
is a "service" and not a "sale."

52. See cases cited notes 58-72 infra.
53. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963); B. F. Goodrich Co.
v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Ewing v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 202
F. Supp. 216 (D. Minn. 1962); Spada v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 819 (D.
Ore. 1961).
54. VA. CODE ANN. §8-654.3 (1960 Supp.); WYo. STAT. §§40A-318 (1961 Cum.

Supp.).
55. 24 Conn. Supp. 409, 192 A.2d 555 (C.P. 1963).
56. 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P. 1963).

57. Contra, Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
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Other products for which strict liability upon the warranty theory
has been found include automobiles, 58 animal food,5 9 tires, ° airplanes, 61 airplane instruments,62 grinding wheels, 63 cinder building
blocks,64 electric cable, 65 insecticide spray, 66 herbicide, 7 children's
playground equipment,6 8 chairs,69 a riveting machine,70 a water
72
heater,7' and a gas range.
Promulgation of the new Restatement section will certainly
prompt consideration by many more courts of strict liability in tort
as the ground of decision in products liability cases. The problems
arising in one jurisdiction's deliberations are examined below.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN FLORIDA

It has been commented that "Florida has gone to the forefront
of the states that have resolved the questions involved in this
[products liability] area in a logical and just manner." 73 It appears
58. Thompson v. Reedman, 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961); Picker X-Ray
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. Munic. Ct. App. 1962); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W.2d 449
(1961); Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962); Jarnot
v. Ford Motor Co., 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 559 (1959); General Motors Corp. v.
Dodson, 47 Tenn.App. 438, 338 S.W.2d 655 (1960).
59. McAfee v. Cargill, Inc., 121 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1954); Midwest Game
Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547 (Mo. 1959).
60. B. F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Hart v.
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 214 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Ind. 1963).
61. Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) applying
California law; Conlon v. Republic Aviation Corp., 204 F. Supp. 865 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) applying Michigan law.
62. Taylerson v. American Airlines, 183 F. Supp. 882 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
63. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 54 Cal. 2d 339, 353 P.2d 575 (1959); Jabukowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (Super.
Ct. 1963).
64. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply Co., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W.2d 873 (1958).

65. Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, Inc., 104 So.
2d 40 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
66. McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F. Supp. 252 (D. Conn. 1960).
67. Spada v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 195 F. Supp. 819 (D. Ore. 1961).
68. McBurnette v. Playground Equip. Corp., 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1962).
69. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956); Thomas v. Leary, 15
App. Div. 2d 438, 225 N.Y.S.2d 137 (1962).
70. Hoffman v. Cox, 35 Misc. 2d 103, 229 N.Y.S.2d 485 (1962).
71. Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124 (2d Cir. 1963) applying Vermont
law.
72. Morrow v. Caloric Appliances, 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
73. Parkinson & Sanders, Implied Warranty in Florida, 12 U. FLA. L. REV. 241,
247 (1959).
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that such a statement is not justified. A study of the decisions relating to products liability reveals that, although Florida has seemingly emerged as a leading jurisdiction, the path has been tortuous
and the law remains confused in many areas. A review of these decisions will make it amply clear that the Florida courts are facing
many of the same doctrinal problems that courts throughout the
country have faced. The result is needless confusion.
Food
The food and drink decisions do, however, proceed in a logical
and ordered fashion. Every case since Blanton v. Cudahy Packing
74
Co.,
decided in 1944, has held that there is an implied warranty of
wholesomeness that runs from the manufacturer of food and drink to
the ultimate consumer. 75 This warranty also applies to the retailer76
77
Strict
and to the purveyor of food for consumption on the premises.
liability is imposed and the warranty is breached upon the mere showing of an unwholesome condition that caused injury to the plaintiff.
There is no requirement that the consumer assert negligence, nor
need he negate the possibility that the deleterious substance was
introduced after leaving the manufacturer.78 It has also been held
that a similar liability against a bottler attaches to the defective
bottle through an implied warranty of merchantability.79 The court
expressly stated, however, that such a warranty did not extend to all
food containers."0
Although the food and drink area is reasonably clear, a recent
district court decision s ' seems to inject an unwarranted exception.
In a nonfood case the court held that even though lack of privity was
no longer a bar to a suit in implied warranty, such liability runs only
to the ultimate user and not to an innocent bystander injured by
the product. This holding could apparently apply in the food area
if, for example, a soft drink bottle exploded and put out the eye of
a third person. How logical is such a holding? Is there any reason
74. 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
75. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958); Florida
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953); Sencer v. Carl's
Markets Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950); Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So.
2d 476 (Fla. 1949); Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840 (2d D.C.A.

Fla. 1960).
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Sencer v. Carl's Markets Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950).
Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949).
Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958).
Canada Dry Bottling Co. v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
Rodriguez v. Shell's City Inc., 141 So. 2d 590 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
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for a law that holds manufacturers strictly liable on socio-economic
grounds and then limits this liability on the basis of the chance
direction of injurious projectiles? With this one possible exception,
however, it is safe to assert that both the manufacturer and the retailer will be held liable in implied warranty without privity to anyone injured by a defective product for human consumption or other
intimate bodily use.
Other Products
The Florida law imposing liability with respect to other products
is less uniform. The confusion seems to arise primarily from the intermingling of sales, contract, and negligence theories; the unnecessary requirement that manufacturer, retailer, and wholesaler be differentiated; and, the attempt to make old doctrines fit an emerging
new mold.
Despite this lack of uniformity, it is relatively easy to present cases
that seem to trace a direct progression toward the availability to the
user of both the implied warranty and negligence actions, without
privity, against anyone in the distributive chain. Although this can
be done, it would not indicate the true tenor of the decisions; consequently, the cases that seem to establish the trend will be presented
first, followed by those decisions that indicate the confusion that remains.
a. Negligence
As far back as 1954 the Florida courts seemed to recognize that
the use of the privity requirement in products liability cases based
upon negligence was undesirable. In Slavin v. McCain,8 2 where a
plumbing company was found liable for an injury caused by a faulty
wash basin, the court did not entirely repudiate the privity requirement in negligence cases. It stated instead that, although it was a
"well-settled" rule that manufacturers were not liable to those with
whom they were not in privity, there are "as many exceptions to the
rule as there are factual situations to which it is applied."8 3 Then, in
1963, the Second District Court in Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co. 84 stated without equivocation that the doctrine of products liability for negligent manufacture without privity is followed in Florida.
There are certain confusing aspects of the law in this area. The
1958 case of Rawls v. Zeigler8- interjects a rule for recovery by a non82.
83.
84.
85.

73 So. 2d 902 (Fla. 1954).
Id. at 902.
149 So. 2d 898 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
107 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 1958).
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user of the product. The court stated therein that the liability of
the manufacturer in negligence, without privity, should be limited to
users of the product and those in the vicinity of such use who are
injured as the result of an inherently or imminently dangerous defect.
It seems that predicting just what such a defect might be could prove
extremely difficult. Since the product was a defective motor vehicle,
already classified as a dangerous instrumentality in Florida,6 this
case does not answer the question.
When confronted with the curious case of Odom v. Gulf Tire &
Supply Co.,87 there can be no doubt that some doctrinal difficulty remains in this area. The federal district court, allegedly applying
Florida law, held that any plaintiff not in privity cannot recover unless he falls within the long outmoded MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co. 8 rule. This rule requires a plaintiff, not in privity, to prove that
the product is dangerous in and of itself or that it is dangerous if
defective in order to recover in a suit based upon negligence. Although such a holding cannot be said to accurately represent the
Florida position, it demonstrates that all is not crystal clear.
b. Implied Warranty
In 1952 it appeared that a recovery on an implied warranty theory
without privity was to be limited to the food and intimate bodily use
areas. In Lambert v. Sistrunk 9 the court rejected the implied warranty theory of recovery where the plaintiff was injured by a defective stepladder because such a product did not fall within those
categories.
Yet, only one year later, the Florida Supreme Court seemingly reversed its position. In Hoskins v.Jackson Grain Co.90 strict liability
for mislabeling of seeds was applied against a wholesaler not in privity
with the plaintiff-buyer. This was not an action against the manufacturer, and property damage rather than personal injury was involved, yet the court did make .the unequivocal statement that it had
"become aligned with those courts holding that suit [in implied
warranty] may be brought against the manufacturer notwithstanding
want of privity."'91
Then, in 1958, the Third District Court of Appeal rendered a decision 9 2 that is refreshing in its concise handling of the problem of
86. Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

196 F. Supp. 35 (N.D. Fla. 1961).
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
58 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1952).
63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953).
Id. at 515.
Continental Copper & Steel Indus. v. E. C. "Red" Cornelius, 104 So. 2d 40
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manufacturers' liability. The plaintiff had purchased and installed
underground electrical cable that became defective and had to be replaced within six months. In allowing recovery of the replacement
cost from the manufacturer, the court stated without reservation,
citing Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co.93 and Hoskins, that a plaintiff
can sue for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability without
being in privity. This decision has been referred to in support of the
final draft of section 402A of the Restatement as one of the foundation cases for strict liability without privity applied against the manu9
facturer for property damage. 4

Finally, in Posey v. Pensacola Tractor & Equipment Co.95 and
Posey v. Ford Motor Co. 96 the First District Court held that an implied warranty of merchantability is not superseded by an express
warranty, and also, that recovery upon implied warranty against
the manufacturer may be had by a remote plaintiff.
A reading of only the above decisions would lead to the conclusion
that the Florida courts have dealt with this problem in a clear and
concise manner; however, conceptual difficulty is manifest in other
cases. The trend in Florida is obviously toward the position adopted
by the Restatement as far as recovery is concerned, but the use of
abstract legal doctrines borrowed from sales and contract law often
serve to confuse the issue and obstruct progress. A few examples of
this may be noted below.
In a 1956 case, Mathews v. Lawnlite Co., 97 a prospective purchaser
was testing an aluminum lawn chair when its moving parts severed
his finger. The manufacturer was held liable, but the significance
of the holding is lost in the nebulous language of the court. The
rule that an innocent user can recover from a manufacturer with
whom he is not in privity was announced, but in searching for legal
justification for its decisions the court entered the conceptual jungle
inherent in the problem. The court cited the Restatement of Torts9s
to the effect that a manufacturer is liable in negligence if defective
design makes the product dangerous for normal use, but then, discussed liability imposed through use of implied warranty. Upon this
juxtaposition of theories, the "imminently dangerous" doctrine was
introduced, thus compounding the confusion. Justice Cardozo propounded this theory in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.99 as an excep(3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
93. 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
94. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964).
95. 138 So. 2d 777 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
96. 138 So. 2d 781 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
97. 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §398 (1964).
99. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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tion to the privity rule in negligence cases whereby a manufacturer
could be held liable if he had introduced a defect into the product
that made it "imminently dangerous" for normal use. The Florida
Supreme Court, however, utilized the Cardozo exception to the privity
rule in negligence actions in discussing the implied warranty theory
while stating that a lawn chair is not imminently dangerous. The
only safe conclusion to be made concerning Lawnlite is that a manufacturer may be found liable to one not in privity for products outside the human consumption area. The case has been used as precedent for this proposition both in negligence 00 and implied warranty' 01 actions. Such a decision, while consonant with current trends,
serves only to confuse both the practitioner attempting to relate the
facts of his case to an available theory of liability and the court that
must decide the issue of law.
Clarkson v. Hertz Corp.L0 2 is an illustration of the unusual construction the federal courts often place upon the law of Florida. The
plaintiffs sued the Hertz Corporation for injuries sustained when the
brakes locked on their rented car. The suit, grounded upon implied
warranty, was against the lessor and not the manufacturer; however,
the court discussed application of warranty theory against both retailer and manufacturer saying: "We think it immaterial whether such
liability be considered as arising by implied warranty or under concepts of tort law, because in any event ... the duty on the party to
be charged remains one of due care."'' 3 Perhaps the Fifth Circuit
was merely not ready at that time to extend liability without fault
to this area.
The Third District Court of Appeal decision in Hector Supply Co.
v. Carter,04 in 1960, was heralded as placing Florida among those
enlightened jurisdictions that do not require privity of contract as a
requisite to recovery in implied warranty regardless of the product
involved105 Nevertheless, this holding was changed by the Florida
Supreme Court,106 and the case serves to illustrate another area of
needless complexity in the law. The plaintiff was a maintenance
employee who was injured when the frame of a lawnmower sulky,
purchased by his employer from defendant, broke beneath him. The
district court held there could be no implied warranty raised against
the retailer where the defect was equally discoverable to the buyer
and the seller, but that privity of contract was never requisite to re100. Rawls v. Zeigler, 107 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1958).
101. King v. Douglas Aircraft, 159 So. 2d 108 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
102. 266 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1959).
103. Id. at 950. (Emphasis added.)
104. 122 So. 2d 22 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
105. 1 HuRSH, AMER.CAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LAmiLrrY §6.63 (lst ed. 1961).
106. Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla. 1961).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1964

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [1964], Art. 5

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

covery on an implied warranty theory. The Supreme Court then held
that the lower court had reached the correct result, no liability, but
for the wrong reasons. They held that there must be privity between
the retailer and the injured party, except in food and possibly dangerous instrumentality cases, before any recovery could be had in implied
warranty. The court went on to say that, if warranty did lie, equal
opportunity to inspect or obtain knowledge of the defect was irrelevant. The court thus affirmed that a recovery based upon breach of
implied warranty is, in effect, in strict liability, yet specifically precluded such recovery, without privity, against retailers, unless the
product falls within the two named exceptions. The court failed to
offer any opinion as to the status of strict liability against a manitfacturer for any product.
Another example of the doctrinal morass, from which the court
must struggle to extricate itself, is illustrated by the 1961 case of
MeBurnette v. Playground Equipment Corp.107 The court managed
to find a theory that allowed the plaintiff to recover, but had it been
slightly less inventive, an innocent child would have been left without
redress. The case involved a suit by a three-year old boy whose finger
had been severed by playground equipment purchased for him by his
father. The suit was brought against the manufacturer and the retailer on both negligence and implied warranty theories. The trial
court dismissed both complaints against the retailer, and the plaintiff
appealed. The district court, citing the Carter case as authority, held
that a cause of action in negligence was shown by the allegations that
the retailer knew or should have known of the defect. The plaintiff
sought review of the adverse ruling on implied warranty. The Florida
Supreme Court held that, as an exception to the Carter rule, a suit
in implied warranty against a retailer by a plaintiff not in privity may
be brought if the intended benefit of the sale was to the plaintiff. The
court was required to erect a technical contract doctrine (third party
beneficiary) in order to evade its own rule (no recovery against retailer without privity), which was made pursuant to technical sales
doctrine, neither of which were promulgated to deal with personal
injury.
As a final example of conceptual difficulties, Brookshire v. Florida
Bendix Co.108 should be noted. The plaintiff was injured by a coinoperated washing machine. She sued the Florida distributing subsidiary, Florida Bendix Company, of the manufacturer, Bendix Corporation, for breach of implied warranty. The Third District Court held
107.
1962).
108.
1964).

130 So. 2d 117 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1961), cert. granted, 137 So. 2d 563 (Fla.
153 So. 2d 55 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963), cert. denied, 163 So. 2d 881
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that the "liability of the manufacturer, under the doctrine of implied
warranty has not been extended to one who merely rents or bails
personal property [which it has purchased from the manufacturer] to
another."109 Here again we see that hangover from the law of sales,
privity, asserting itself. As a matter of practical fact, Bendix Corporation and Florida Bendix Company are the same entity, yet they assume separate legal character upon which the law of sales may operate.
It seems axiomatic that if the policy behind the extension of liability
in this field is to be served, the plaintiff should have been allowed
to recover if she could prove any defective condition.
It cannot be expected that every court will agree with or even be
aware of the policy factors involved in all areas of the law. They
must rely to a large extent on the law as stated in analogous situations.
If that law is such that it is highly confusing as a result of its evolution from situations that do not deal with the problems of compensation for personal injury, the particular court cannot be censured for
the result. What is needed is a legal approach that directly considers
the policy problems.
c. Most Recent Decisions
Remaining for consideration are the latest cases basing liability
upon implied warranty theory. Both, King v. Douglas Aircraft Co.110
and Green v. American Tobacco Co.,~ are straightforward and to
the point, but each falls within those often mentioned exceptions of
human consumption and dangerous instrumentality. Because of these
exceptions, these cases cannot be said to place Florida categorically
in line with those jurisdictions that hold a manufacturer strictly liable
as to all products for product defects notwithstanding lack of privity.
In King v. Douglas Aircraft Co." 2 the Third District Court managed to pierce the conceptual veil and arrive at a decision squarely
within the modern trend. In finding that the implied warranty of
merchantability ran from the aircraft manufacturer to the airline passenger, the court did not stumble over the fact that there was no privity or that there was no "sale" of a product. 13 The court is to be
commended for not utilizing the dangerous instrumentality exception
to the privity rule in order to hold the manufacturer liable. It is

109. Id. at 58.
110.
111.

159 So. 2d 108 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).

112. 159 So. 2d 108 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
113. This is in reference to the technical sales doctrine that there can be no
implied warranty raised by sale of a service. See Epstein v. Giannattasio, supra

note 56.
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unfortunate, however, that the product involved can be classified as a
dangerous instrumentality, and the precedent value of the case thereby diluted.
Similarly, it is unfortunate that the case of Green v. American
Tobacco Co." 4 falls within the human consumption category. Nevertheless, Green carries other unique implications that should be examined. This case involved a suit in implied warranty against the
manufacturer of the cigarettes that allegedly caused the death of
plaintiff's decedent. The federal district court jury found that death
was attributable to lung cancer and that cigarette smoking was a
proximate cause of this cancer. The plaintiff was denied recovery on
the basis of a finding that by reasonable application of human skill
and foresight the defendant could not have known that users of their
cigarettes would be endangered. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed"5 the trial court holding that the Florida "implied warranty
of fitness for the general purposes intended" did not cover deleterious
substances, the harmful effects of which could not have been known
by any developed human skill or foresight. Based upon the dissent
of one member of the three-man court, a rehearing was granted at
which time the single question of possibility of knowledge was certified to the Florida Supreme Court for a decision. The answer was
direct and to the point. The court held that manufacturer's or seller's
actual knowledge or opportunity for knowledge is wholly irrelevant to
his liability on the theory of implied warranty of merchantability.
The court also clearly distinguished this type of warranty from the
implied warranty of fitness for the particular purpose, which it stated
was dependent upon the purchaser's reliance on the superior skill
and judgment of the seller. The court went on to state that Florida
law recognizes no reasonable distinction can be drawn between the
physical and the practical impossibility of obtaining knowledge of
the harmful character of a product." 6
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court has promulgated a unique rule
that could have far-reaching implications. No jurisdiction has yet
gone so far as to negate completely impossibility of knowledge as a
defense to products liability. In section 402A of the Restatement,
114.

154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).

115. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
116. After receipt of the Florida Supreme Court's answer to the question
certified, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding
that the evidence was sufficient to present a jury question whether the defendant
manufacturer's cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome for human consumption. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963). Subsequently,
a federal district court jury returned a verdict for the defendant, impliedly finding
that the cigarettes were reasonably fit and wholesome for human consumption.
St. Petersburg [Fla.] Times, Nov. 29, 1964, p. 1, col. 2.
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which extends strict liability to all sellers for all products, the commentary specifically states that if the harmful nature of the product
can be ascertained through human skill and foresight the manufacturer is under a duty to warn the consuming public, but if such
knowledge is not obtainable then there can be no liability. 117 It can
readily be observed that the Green holding could lead to a liability
that would be both socially and economically undesirable. There is
little quarrel today with the statement that it is socially desirable to
discourage the manufacture of cigarettes, but what of the cholesterol
in meat, milk, and butter; the alcohol or codeine in medicines; or the
unnamed substances in other seemingly innocuous products that
science may discover are dangerous? Is it desirable that development
of products for human betterment be hindered by the threat of
liability from an unascertainable source? It appears that Florida, apparently reticent about categorically joining those jurisdictions that
apply strict liability to all sellers of all products, has proceeded one
step too far in the human consumption and intimate bodily use
category.
d. Summary
The current state of the law in Florida can be summarized briefly;
however, it must constantly be borne in mind that the usage of the
various products liability theories remains confused and a prediction
of the outcome of any particular case remains a hazardous proposition.
Negligence. This theory can probably be utilized by any user or
consumer against the manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer without
any privity requirement. Such a cause of action can be maintained by
a nonuser or bystander who is injured as a result of an inherently or
imminently dangerous defect.
Implied Warranty. Under Florida implied warranty theory, a bystander cannot avail himself of liability without privity regardless
of the type product involved. Also, under an implied warranty of
fitness for the particular purpose, plaintiff must prove reliance upon
the seller's superior skill and judgment, and that the defendant-seller
had a better opportunity to obtain knowledge of the defect. The
implied warranty discussed below is that of merchantability.
1. Human Consumption and Intimate Bodily Use. An action
against anyone in the sales chain may be brought under implied warranty without privity by the ultimate consumer. Such liability attaches
without any showing of a lack of due care.
117.

REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS §402A (1964).
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2. Dangerous Instrumentalities. The law in this area is so limited
that it is difficult to draw meaningful conclusions; however, dicta indicates that practices similar to those in the food area will be followed.
3. All Other Products
(a) Retailer-the liability here is limited to those in privity
except insofar as the product is purchased for the obvious intended
use of another, such as a toy for a child.
(b) Wholesaler -liability here is similar to that of the retailer
with the exception that the purchaser of mislabeled seed may sue
for resultant property damage although he is not in privity.
(c) Manufacturer-although the decisions have not been uniform, it appears that a suit against the manufacturer by the user
not in privity stands a good chance of success. Such a suit may
be brought whether property damage or personal injury has occurred. Florida has not yet placed itself specifically in line with
strict liability without privity for all products, but it seems to be
only a matter of time.
The laws of sales, contract, and negligence have all been used by
Florida courts to deal with products liability. The doctrines have
been bent, battered, torn, and twisted in attempts to make them fit
a pattern for which they were not designed. The following is a list
of problems and situations with which the Florida courts have grappled utilizing any mixture of these doctrines as tools:
(1) Is privity in negligence and in warranty actions necessary
for recovery?
(2) What type of warranty is implied - merchantability, fitness
for the general purpose, or fitness for the particular purpose?
(3) Is reliance upon the seller's skill and judgment required?
(4) Who is liable, under what theory - manufacturer, wholesaler, retailer, bailor, lessor?
(5) Was there equal opportunity to inspect?
(6) What is the scope of the warranty?
(7) Was it a "sale" or a "service"?
(8) Can there be liability with all due care shown?
(9) Does an express warranty supersede an implied one and
if so, when?
(10) Does liability extend to users, consumers, third party
beneficiaries, or innocent bystanders?
How many of these problems can be solved by utilization of the direct
approach suggested below? It is submitted that the great majority can.
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THE RESTATEMENT APPROACH

The doctrinal problems arising in products liability cases are, to
a large extent, a result of the commingling of various theories of
liability. Clarity and discrimination in the terms used to describe
liability will lead to a simplification in the law and greater consideration of more relevant factors. A rational approach to the various
problems involved is suggested in the analytical comments to section
402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second."18 Although no court has
as yet worked through the theoretical murk surrounding products
liability in exactly this manner, the policy expressed in the decisions
lends credence to this analysis.
The following comments from the Restatement explain terms used
in section 402A appearing above; each clarifies a specific problem that
has been a source of confusion to the courts in this area.
(a) Business of Selling." 9 The rule applies to all persons engaged in the business of selling products for use or consumption manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer. It does not apply to an individual who makes casual sales of, for example, his automobile or
other personal items. The policy basis is one of special responsibility for public safety assumed by those who carry on the business
of supplying products that may endanger person or property,
coupled with a forced public reliance upon them.
(b) Defective Condition.120 The product must be in a defective

condition, not contemplated by the consumer, and unreasonably
dangerous at the time it leaves the seller's hands. The burden of
proof of defect at this time is upon the injured consumer. Subsequent mishandling will relieve the original seller of liability, but
packaging and other precautions must be taken to insure continued
safety in normal handling for a reasonable length of time. Abnormal handling or abnormal consumption of an otherwise safe
product will result in no liability. Defects in the container as well
as the product itself are included.
(c) UnreasonablyDangerous.'2 ' The product "must be dangerous to ,anextent beyond that which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics. Good whiskey
is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad
whiskey, containing a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good tobacco is not unreasonably dangerous
118.
119.

Ibid.
RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), TORTS §402A, comment

j

(1964).

120. Id. comment g.
121. Id. comment i.
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merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful; but tobacco
containing something like marijuana may be unreasonably dangerous."122

(d) Directions of Warning.123 Such instructions may be required to prevent the product from being considered unreasonably
dangerous. If the product contains an ingredient allergenic to
a substantial number of people and the danger is not generally
known, or if known the ingredient would not be reasonably expected to be found in the product, warning is required, if the
seller has or should have knowledge of the ingredient and concomitant danger.
(e) Unavoidably Unsafe Products. 124 Products such as rabies
vaccine and new or experimental drugs for which there can be no
assurances of safety or purity, if justified by medical experience,
and properly made, marketed, and appropriate warning given will
not be held unreasonably dangerous, therefore not subject to strict
liability.
(f) User or Consumer.125 No contractual relation is required
between the seller and the ultimate user or consumer. Consumers
include those who prepare a product for consumption as well as
those who actually consume it. All uses for which the product is
intended are included in "consumption." Those passively enjoying
the benefits of a product, as airplane passengers, or doing work
upon it are included as "users" of the product.
(g) Warranty.126 "The rule stated in this Section does not
require any reliance on the part of the consumer upon the reputation, skill or judgment of the seller who is to be held liable, nor
any representation or undertaking on the part of that seller. The
seller is strictly liable although, as is frequently the case, the consumer does not even know who he is at the time of consumption.
The rule stated in this Section is not governed by the provisions
of the Uniform Sales Act, or those of the Uniform Commercial
Code; and it is not affected by limitations on the scope and content
of warranties, or by any limitation to 'buyer' and 'seller' in those
statutes. Nor is the consumer required to give notice to the seller
of his injury within a reasonable time after it occurs, as is provided by the Uniform Act. The consumer's cause of action does
not depend upon the validity of his contract with the person from
122. Id. The Restatement's approach to "unreasonably dangerous" products
would clearly exclude a result such as that reached in the Florida Supreme Court's
decision in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
123. Id. comment j.
124. Id. comment k.
125. Id. comment 1.
126. Id. comment m.
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whom he acquires the product, and it is not affected by any disclaimer or other agreement, whether it be between the seller and
his immediate buyer, or attached to and accompanying the product
into the hands of the consumers. In short, 'warranty' must be
given a new and different meaning if it is to be used in connection
with this Section. It is much simpler to regard the liability here
stated as merely one of strict liability in tort."127
(h) Contributory Negligence.128 Where the plaintiff's negligence consists merely in failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence, it is not
a defense to the strict liability provided under the section. Where
it consists in "voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger," this is a defense as it is in other types of
strict liability.
Although not perfect, the approach outlined in the Restatement
has the advantage of directness and cuts through the web of legal
detours that has surrounded products liability for so long.
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

A brief history of products liability, the legal theories upon which
it has been based, a glimpse of the current national trends, a more
extensive view of Florida law, and a suggested solution to the problem
by the American Law Institute have been noted. The law of products
liability has taken an unprecedented shift toward strict liability in
favor of the ultimate user or consumer at the expense of all those
within the distributional chain, and most specifically against the
manufacturer.
That this development has and is taking place there can be no
doubt. 29 The question then becomes one of policy. Does this change
have a valid social function? The law of any libertarian society must
eventually reflect the needs and desires of the people it serves. Does
a law that makes those who are responsible for the distribution of
products strictly liable to those who use them serve this society?
Until this century the United States was a developing nation.
Economic society was relatively simple in comparison with today's
complexity. Commerce was largely confined to local areas. In a
setting such as this, the law insulating the commercial sector from
those not in privity was perhaps normal and natural. It suited the
127.
128.

Id. comment m.
Id. comment n.

129. FRumR &FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILrIY (1961); HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF
PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1961); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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needs of society as a whole. The development of the nation was
largely dependent upon individual initiative, which, it was believed,
should not be inhibited by extending the theory of liability without
fault. The industrial and commercial sphere had to be strengthened
by means of capital accumulation. An injury or loss to an individual
was believed to be less a detriment to society as a whole than a loss
to the commercial segment struggling to establish itself. Against this
background, the doctrines of privity and fault liability are readily
understandable.
Society no longer needs such laws. As complexity and mobility increase, the gap between the manufacturer and the ultimate consumer
continues to expand. The variety of products, packaging, distribution, and advertising techniques all lead toward an increasing reliance
by the user upon those responsible for placing the goods at his disposal rather than upon his own knowledge and ability to inspect. This
very remoteness and complexity also serves to make it increasingly
difficult to ascertain who, if anyone, was at fault for an injury. The
trend toward mass production and distribution makes it feasible for
business to spread a loss, which to an individual would be ruinous,
throughout society as a cost of doing business. In this way loss is
lifted from the shoulders of those innocent parties who can least
afford it, and, at worst, spread among the many who in the aggregate
can afford a loss. The above is the basic policy reasoning underlying
the sweeping change in the law.
In particular, there seem to be two basic reasons why the current
trend toward a form of strict liability without privity is desirable.
First, extension of liability will tend to reduce the incidence of product caused injury. Some would argue, however, that such an extension would have no substantial impact. This argument does not
seem well-founded. As noted below, many large manufacturers have
already instituted an increase in quality control directed toward minimizing injurious defects. An increase in diligence on the part of the
manufacturer is the most effective method of reducing such injuries
because he is the only one with any substantial control. Effectuation
of the injury prevention policy must be accomplished at the manufacturing level.
An analogy can be drawn to the effect of workmen's compensation
laws on industrial safety practices. Since their widespread introduction, industry has become considerably more safety conscious. Virtually every sizable manufacturing location has a member of management trained in safety procedures. Awards, banquets, and ceremonies are given based upon safety achievement. Why the recent
emphasis on safety? It can be attributed certainly in part to the fact
that it is economically advantageous to the employer to be safety
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conscious because his workmen's compensation rates are based upon
his safety history. 13 It seems that this same principle may operate so
as to encourage production of safer products. The employer, through
his liability insurance rates, will have a financial stake in doing what
he can to eliminate possible injury producing defects.
The second principal policy factor influencing the current trend
is the growing feeling that an innocent injured party should not be
made to suffer his loss alone if there is any reasonable way he can be
compensated. When a person is injured by another's negligent act the
fault theory of liability would appear to be an adequate process
through which the plaintiff can be redressed for products liability;
however, there is virtually no way to affirmatively prove negligence on
the part of anyone in the distributive chain even with the aid of
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; thus, fault liability is not adequate.
If this is the case, is there a better way? Can any segment of society
be found that can bear the loss without significant hardship?
The business community can distribute such a loss as a cost of doing business. Prices can be raised to cover the increased liability incurred directly or to provide for the necessary liability insurance. The
idea is not a plan to penalize the rich, but rather to find a good loss
distributor. He should be one who is in a position to exercise some
control over the injury producing characteristics of the product as
well as in a position to distribute the losses that do occur. The business community, particularly the manufacturer, certainly meets these
criteria.
The most frequent argument heard in opposition to the loss distribution theory concerns the effect of the policy on the small or marginal producer. It is argued that he is not in a position to bear increased liability because he cannot competitively increase his prices
and does not exert substantial control over the product. Imposing
the loss upon him is said to be equally as ruinous as forcing the injured party to bear it alone. A situation can be hypothesized when the
defendant is a mere conduit for the product, where he is unable to
maintain any action over due to jurisdictional or other reasons, where
he cannot afford adequate insurance to cover his liability or realistically recover his loss by way of a price increase, and where the particular loss would result in business collapse; in this extreme case,
such an argument may have merit. It should be kept in mind, however, that such a situation represents only the smallest minority of
cases and the over-all policy goal, that of distributing the loss to
avoid crushing the individual victim, is best served by the products
liability extension discussed in this note.

130.

2 LARSON,

VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §92.60 (1952).
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Another argument against the extension of liability that deserves
mention is that there is simply no need to impose strict liability. The
plaintiff must prove that the product is defective and that the defect
caused his injury whether the theory of liability be strict or negligence.
Once he has done this, with the aid of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, he can almost invariably recover in negligence anyway. Such an
argument is basically unsound. There is a greater chance that the
jury will find for the defendant if negligence must be proved, even
if the doctrine is used. There is also the practical fact that the size
of the verdict will often be reduced by producing evidence of due
care. This being the case, settlement negotiations are likely to be a
failure, and the needless costs of litigation are added to the expenses
to be borne by the parties. Also, even though liability will lie against
the manufacturer, it may be impossible for plaintiff to gain jurisdiction over him, or he may be the least financially responsible party.
In such a case a negligence action against the retailer or wholesaler
is usually of no use, and the innocent plaintiff is left without recourse.
THE SURVEY

Speculation as to the ultimate result of increased liability may take
on more meaning in light of the pragmatic effect of these decisions
upon the group most directly concerned. It was with this in mind
that a survey of change in manufacturers' attitudes and practices in
response to these decisions was undertaken among corporate counsel.
The sensitive nature of this area, despite assurances of confidential
treatment of names and information, undoubtedly held down the
percentage of returns. One hundred questionnaires were mailed and
forty were returned, of which twelve refused to make any comment on
the grounds of suits pending. Those counsel who did answer, however, were quite candid, adding some element of reliability. The results of the survey (see Appendix) may lend themselves to differing
interpretations, but it is believed that several conclusions can be
validly drawn.
Strict liability has been imposed for the longest period of time
on food producers, processors, and purveyors. It is interesting to
note that the greatest percentage of answers to the survey came from
the food group. This is indicative of a heightened awareness of the
problem on their part, as a result of longer imposition of strict
liability. Nearly half of this group, in answer to question IA, stated
that they have either considered or instituted increases in their outlay
for quality control. This percentage corresponds with the figure for
the sampling as a whole, fully half considering or already instituting
a greater measure of quality control.
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The results from this factual question conflict with the answers to
question 3B (Would increased liability lead to safer products?),
which was designed to elicit an answer reflecting attitudes. While
half of the participants said that they had considered or were in fact
increasing quality control, an overwhelming number answered flatly
that increased liability will not lead to safer products.
An answer perhaps minimizing this discrepancy was received from
18
one participant. '
In mass produced products you do not inspect quality into a
product; you have to build it into the product. Additional inspections would only serve unreasonably to inflate the cost.
The development of improved production practices, which is
the object of good quality control, is a matter of gradually acquired know-how and cannot be accomplished by increased
expenditures where a high level of quality is already being
achieved.
Only two other participants in the survey agreed, however, that increased research and testing expenditures would be more beneficial
than the continued expense of increased quality control. Moreover,
ten participants indicated that increased quality control was more
beneficial and four of these were consumer item manufacturers.
The attitudes toward effectiveness of express warranties and disclaimers as devices to insulate the manufacturer from liability varied
directly with the type of product involved. Food manufacturers, as
might be expected, thought them generally ineffective (not to mention
the effect that they might have on product acceptance), while a majority of consumer item manufacturers thought them to be effective.
As devices to influence consumer psychology in discouraging suits,
however, half the food processors (who usually don't use them)
thought that they were effective, while a majority of the consumer
item manufacturers (who do use them) considered them ineffective
for this purpose.
A key argument against extension and increased application of
products liability against the manufacturer has always been, that it
will result in inhibition of the development of new products. Manufacturers, it is argued, will be afraid to experiment in producing and
marketing new products that might result in an increased incidence
of liability. The survey results would seem to blunt this argument
to some extent. Nearly half of those manufacturers answering expressed the view that increased liability would not inhibit new product development. One industrial manufacturer's counsel expressed
132
the opinion:
131. Letter to the authors, July 23, 1964.
132. Letter to the authors, July 9, 1964.
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On the contrary, it would probably encourage development of
new products which have proved troublesome. Of course, there
may be concerns which push into the market with new products
without adequate testing. A firm with a valuable trademark
like ours and a reputation for uniformly high-quality products
cannot afford to market new products without thorough testing, and I question whether the trend of the law will have any
effect upon us in this respect.
A different view, however, was expressed by counsel for a food
manufacturer: 133

In effect an increase in a manufacturer's liability means an increase in the reasonable care which he must use in research,
development, manufacture, distribution and merchandising of
his products. This, in turn, requires greater expenditures to
provide such care. To the extent that greater expenditures
to provide reasonable care decreases the funds available for
research or makes the profit picture for an unknown new product less attractive, the development of new products is inhibited.
Insurance is a factor in any area of expanding liability that, al:
though formally ignored by the courts, cannot be discounted. The
survey confirms what might be expected to be occurring. Over onethird of those manufacturers answering have experienced a noticeable
rate increase in their products liability insurance. Two-thirds of
those answering foresee a noticeable rate increase and two-fifths expect
a need for expanded liability coverage, particularly in the food and
consumer item industries.
Another area of concern to manufacturers was mentioned repeatedly in the general comments solicited as an integral part of the survey.
As articulately expressed by the general counsel of a large consumer
appliance manufacturer: 134

To my knowledge none of the cases that dispense with privity
requirements or which, whether under theories of implied
warranty or strict tort liability eliminate the need to prove that
a manufacturer has in any way been negligent, go so far as to
impose on the manufacturer of a conventional product, such
as home appliances, the liability of a guarantor of the safety
of use of the product. Theoretically it is still necessary for the
injured party to show that the product involved in the injury
was in some way defective and that the defect caused his injury.
However, under the theory of spreading the cost of loss among
133.
134.

Letter to the authors, August 19, 1964.
Letter to the authors, July 23, 1964.
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the general public by assessing it against the manufacturer,
once it is decided for this reason that the manufacturer should
be the party held liable, this social objective obviously can
best be served by resolving all questions as to whether there is
a product defect against the manufacturer. The logical development would be to admit evidence of the existence of "defects"
which will have the effect of imposing liability on the manufacturer for non-defective conditions.. . . [T]he greatest danger
to manufacturers from the spread the risk of loss theory of
product liability lies in the prospective relaxing of rules on
admissibility of evidence of defective conditions and of the willingness of jurors to find a defective condition where none
exists.
Counsel for a leading automobile manufacturer concurs in this
135
analysis:
Some courts in creating additional legal duties on the part of
manufacturers have also reduced the burden of proof by plaintiffs in establishing that a defect of manufacture or assembly
was in fact contributory. Occasionally a court is misled into
ignoring the very real burden upon plaintiff to establish that
a "specific defect" in fact caused the accident. This burden
cannot be satisfied merely by a plaintiff testifying that he lost
control of the vehicle because of some strange reaction of the
steering wheel ....
I am not so much disturbed by the elimination of the requirement of a privity of contract as I am the
misapplication of the principles by a judge in allowing rampant conjecture and speculation to replace the requirement
that plaintiff come in with a plausible and technically oriented
theory of what specific part or parts allegedly failed.
It is believed that this justifiable concern on the part of manufacturers can best be handled through adoption by the courts of the
straightforward approach of the Restatement. This approach emphasizes the necessity of establishing a product defect, as opposed to continuing use of the "warranty" rationale, which results in obscuration
of the real issues, including the existence of a defect.
CONCLUSION

The decisions in the area of products liability are in technical
disarray, yet a definite trend is discernible. Modern public policy
as well as reason suggest the simplified and direct approach of the
Restatement of Torts.
155.

Letter to the authors, June 22, 1964.
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This approach has evolved through the decisional process and
has now been crystallized into legal doctrine upon which both the
bench and bar may draw. No one would suggest that changes based
upon particular factual situations as well as societal evolution cannot
and should not be made. The future may dictate a further extension
of liability. Our values may require a form of social insurance, such as
workmen's compensation, to the extent that all injuries suffered in
the course of product use be compensated by the producing sector.
If this position is deemed desirous, the requirements of an "unreasonably dangerous136 and a "defective" product 137 may be eliminated.
On the other hand, if a return toward a concept of fault liability is
in the offing, section 402A (2) (a), 138 which states that the plaintiff is
not required to prove that the defendant was at fault, can be changed
accordingly. The Restatement offers a clear position, free of doctrinal
confusion, from which orderly change may be implemented.
RICHARD

L. HoRN

DANIEL SCARRITT

supra note 120.
supra note 121.

136.

RESTATEMENT,

137.

RESTATEMENT,

138.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS (1964).
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APPENDIX

Results of survey conducted by authors, June-July 1964.

1. QUALITY CONTROL
A. Has increasing the percentage of
expenditure allocable to such
control been considered?
Considered increase
Instituted increase
Already high
B. Does the current market in your
field permit any increase?
Yes
No
No answer
2.

3.

Auto
%

18
29
53

40
20
40

28
14
58

54
23
23

0
50
50

16
50
84

USE OF DISCLAIMERS AND/OREXPRESS
WARRANTIES
A. Do you think such devices are
effective in insulating the manufacturer from implied warranty
liability?
Effective
16
88
Ineffective
84
67
B. Do these devices influence consumer psychology in discouragin g
suits?
50
47
Yes
No
53
50
PRODUCT RESEARCH AND
TESTING
A. Do you feel that an increase in
the expenditure for research and
testing would be more beneficial
than the continued expense of
increased quality control?
Yes
No
Need both
B. Would increased liability lead to
safer products?
Yes
No
C. Would it inhibit development of
new products?
Yes

Consumer
Industrial
Item
%
%

Food
S

Total
0

58
42

0
100

28
72

28
72

88
67

40
60

16
46
88

0
0
100

14
48
38

0
100

0
100

14
86

100
0

10
90

47
53

50
50

72
28

50
50

58
42
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INSURANCE COSTS AND
COVERAGE
A. Has there been any noticeable
rate increase?
Yes
No
B. Do you foresee any?
Yes
No
C. Has there been or do you expect
a need for expanded liability
coverage?
Yes
No
PUBLIC RELATIONS
A. Have you developed any ideas
and/or programs for consumer
relations and education?
Yes
No

32
68

50
50

28
72

100
0

37
63

50
50

100
0

72
28

100
0

67
33

31
69

0
100

56
44

50
50

39
61

48
52

50
50

44
56

50
50

39
61
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